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Fuller: Piercing the Corporate Veil in Workers Compensation Cases

PIERCING THE CORPORATE VEIL IN
WORKERS' COMPENSATION CASES
Before workers' compensation legislation was enacted, only common law
tort remedies were available to employees injured on the job.' Frequently,
however, injured employees were left without remedies because their employers
were not liable for injuries caused by unavoidable industrial accidents.2 Even
when employers were liable, the uncertainties and delays of litigation placed
injured workers at a substantial disadvantage. 3
With workers' compensation acts, legislatures attempted to address the
inequities of common law remedies for injured employees by balancing the
competing interests of employers and employeesA Under the legislative compromise each party surrenders certain advantages of the tort law system to gain
other benefits for themselves and ultimately for society.5 Employees surrender
their right to collect damages in tort from their employers" for more certain
albeit more modest remedies.7 Employers, on the other hand, relinquish their
1.

See generally A.

MILLus

& W. GENTILE, WoaRmrs' COMPENSATION LAW AND INSURANCE

6-12 (1st ed. 1976). Prior to workers' compensation acts, a basic common law tenet prevailed:
employers were liable to employees only for injuries caused by the employer's negligence.
Employers could also be liable for the acts of third parties that caused workers' injuries under
the respondeat superior doctrine. Id.
2. See, e.g., State v. Industrial Comm'n, 92 Ohio St. 434, 450, 111 N.E. 299, 303, (1915)
(attributing most industrial accidents to the inherent risk of employment because often no
party is at fault).
3. W. MALoNE, M. PLANT & J. I rTLE, WORKERS' COMPENSATION AND EMPLOYMENT
RIGHTS 38 (2d ed. 1980) [hereinafter cited as WoRKERs' COMPENSATION]. In most cases both

the facts surrounding the injury and the applicable law were uncertain. The witnesses, usually
co-employees, were torn between loyalty to injured co-workers and fear of reprisal by
employers. The expenses and delays of litigation often pressured injured workers into
settling for less than the true value of their claims. Id. Additionally, an employer's position
was inherently stronger than that of employees' because of the common law defenses of
assumption of risk and contributory negligence. See Priestley v. Fowler, 3 M & W. 1, 150 Eng.
Rep. 1080 (1837) (when workers voluntarily undertake the dangerous conditions of work,
they cannot complain about injuries resulting from those conditions); Butterfield v. Forrester,
11 East 60, 103 Eng. Rep. 926 (1809) (recognizing the defense of contributory negligence).
4. See, e.g., United States Casualty Co. v. Hercules Powder Co., 4 N.J. 157, 162-63, 72 A.2d
190, 193 (1950) (act intended to accomplish economic reform in the legal rights and responsibilities of employees and employers).

5.
6.

See WORKERS' COMPENSATION, supranote 3, at 40.
A. LARSON, 2A THE LAW OF WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION § 65

(11th ed. 1982). The

compensation remedy is the exclusive remedy for the employee against the employer if the
injury falls within the act's coverage. Id. See also Campbell v. Waggoner, 235 Ark. 374, 375-76,
360 S.W.2d 124, 125 (1962) (exclusive remedy provisions of compensation act bar a common
law suit for same injury); Balido v. Improved Mach., Inc., 29 Cal. App. 3d 633, 639, 105 Cal.
Rptr. 890, 899 (1973) (employee recovery under the act forecloses any other recovery against
the employer). But see 2A A. LARSON, supra § 67.10. New Jersey, South Carolina, and Texas
permit employees covered by their acts to choose between statutory and common law
remedies. Thus under these statutes, an employee is not required to surrender his common
law right to sue for full damages. Id.
7. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 440.15 (1981) (limiting recovery for particular injuries). See also
WoRKER's COMPENSATION, supra note 3, at 40.
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freedom from liability in cases in which they are not at faults for limited but
more certain liability.9
Workers' compensation statutes generally limit an employer's liability for
employment-related injuries to the act's specific remedies.'0 Notwithstanding
these statutory limitations on employer liability, injured workers can pursue
common law remedies against third party tortfeasors.", Consequently, determining whether a party is an "employer" or a "third party" under the applicable
act defines the limits of potential liability to injured workers. 12 Because most
compensation statutes fail to define these terms,' 3 courts applying them have
reached inconsistent results. 4 Recently, courts have considered whether a
parent corporation is a third party liable for injuries to its subsidiary's employees or whether it is an employer of the subsidiary's employees and thus
immune from tort liability. 5
For example, assume a wholly-owned subsidiary of a parent corporation
employs the injured worker. The parent directly controls and monitors the
work performed at the subsidiary's plant. In fact, the corporations are so
economically integrated that in reality they function as a single economic
enterprise, yet they remain legally distinct for tax benefits. If the worker's
injuries arose in the course of his employment, workers' compensation benefits
are clearly available from the subsidiary. Nevertheless, courts faced with similar
facts disagree about the parent corporation's liability. Some courts have found
the parent subject to tort liability as a third party tortfeasor while others have
held it immune to tort liability as the worker's employer. 6 Those courts
holding the parent liable as a third party recognize only the subsidiary as the
injured worker's employer and adhere to strict corporate boundaries between
affiliated companies in interpreting compensation acts.' 7 This result, however,
8. See supra note 1.
9. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 440.11 (1981). Typically workers' compensation statutes provide
that the statutory liability of an employer within the act is exclusive and replaces any other
liability of the employer to third party tortfeasors or injured employees. See id.
10. Id.
11. See, e.g., Aaiz. REv. STAT. ANN. §23-1023 (1971 & Supp. 1971-1982); FLA. STAT.
§ 440.39(1) (1981); N.Y. WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAW § 29 (McKinney 1982). See also
Davis, Workmen's Compensation- Using an Enterprise Theory of Employment to Determine
Who Is a Third Party Tort-Feasor,32 U. Psrr. L. REv. 289, 289 (1971).
12. See supra notes 9-11 and accompanying text.
13. Davis, supra note 11, at 289. When statutes do provide definitions, they are too vague
to be of practical value. See, e.g., FA. STAT. § 440.02(4) (1981). The statute defines an employer
as "the state and all political subdivisions thereof, all public and quasi-public corporations
therein, every person carrying on any employment, and the legal representative of a deceased
person or the receiver or trustees of any person." Id.
14. See Davis, supra note 11, at 289.
15. E.g., Gulfstream Land & Dev. Corp. v. Wilkerson, 420 So. 2d 587, 588 (Fla. 1982).
16. Compare Stoddard v. Ling-Temco-Vought, Inc., 513 F. Supp. 314, 327 (C.D. Cal. 1980)
(holding parent company and other subsidiary corporations of the worker's immediate employer were separate entities and entitled to immunity under Texas compensation law) with
Harvey v. Fine Prod. Co., 156 Ga. App. 649, 650, 275 S.E.2d 732, 733 (1980) (holding the
parent corporation to be the alter ego of its subsidiary and therefore immune to a suit by an
injured employee of the subsidiary).
17. See, e.g., McDaniel v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 487 F. Supp. 714, 716 (N.D. Ill.
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may be inconsistent with the purpose of workers' compensation in today's
industrial economy.
This note examines whether the tort immunity provided under workers'
compensation for corporations whose employees suffer work-related injury
should be extended to affiliated corporations. The note initially reviews various
workers' compensation law tests and corporate law concepts used by courts to
determine whether an employment relationship exists. Following a survey of
the current judicial trend, the note analyzes the shortcomings and potential
consequences of this trend. Finally, a proposal is offered for more appropriately
balancing the overlapping policies of compensation and corporate law.

Tim WoRKs' CoMP 'sqATIoN TBiOR"
Workers' compensation statutes reflect a societal determination that consumers who enjoy the benefits of a product should ultimately bear the cost
of injuries resulting from its production.' 8 The ability to obtain insurance to
cover the cost of work-related injuries allows businesses to treat compensation
benefits as a fixed production cost.29 Businesses include this fixed cost in the
price of their products, forcing consumers ultimately to bear the cost of
20
workers' injuries.
Although workers' compensation permits employers to pass the cost of
industrial accidents to consumers, 2' its primary purpose is to compensate
workers in a speedy, certain and efficient manner.2 2 The drafters of compensation legislation made proof of fault unnecessary to recovery for all employmentrelated injuries. 2 Whether an injured worker recovers under workers' compensation depends on the relationship of an accident to the worker's employment
rather than an assigning fault.24 Thus, if the employee can demonstrate that
his injury arose out of his employment, compensation acts provide benefits.
1978) (rejecting arguments that the court should pierce the corporate veil and find that the
parent corporation was plaintiff's employer); Gulfstream Land & Dev. Corp. v. Wilkerson,
420 So. 2d 587, 589 (when benefits of dividing a business accrue to an owner, fairness requires
recognition of separate identities when an injured worker sues).
18. See WoRKERs' CONTENSAMON, supra note 3,at 39-40. See also Employer Mut. Liab.
Ins. Co. v. Konvicka, 197 F.2d 691, 693 (5th Cir. 1952> (purpose of workers' compensation
is to transfer economic loss caused by industrial accidents from worker to consuming public);
Chambers v. District Court of Hennepin County, 139 Minn. 205, 209, 166 N.W. 185, 187
(1918)

(basic principle underlying workers' compensation is that industry should pay for

accidental injuries as a part of the cost of production).
19. See WoRKER's CObwENsATION, supranote 3,at 39.
20. Id.
21. Id. at 39-40. Since each competing enterprise in a given industry is uniformly

affected, no producer gains any substantial competitive advantage or suffers any appreciable
disadvantage because of compensation legislation. Id.
22. E.g., DuPont de Nemours & Co. v. Frechette, 161 F.2d 318, 321 (8th Cir. 1947) (the
purpose of workers' compensation is "to provide certain, effective, speedy, and inexpensive
relief for injured workmen').
28. See WORKER'S COMPENSATION, supra note 3, at 39-40. Compensation acts guarantee
immediate cash for injured employees. This benefit of workers' compensation is particularly

important when the injured employee provides the family's sole income. Id. See also 1 A.
L sON, supra note 6 at § 2.10.
24. See, e.g., Hamilton v. Shell Oil Co., 215 So. 2d 21, 22 (Fla. 4th D.CA. 1968) (re-
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Courts have developed several tests to determine whether an employment
relationship exists.2 s Since most compensation acts only vaguely define the

term "employee," 26 early courts adopted the common law definition of employee used for vicarious tort liability purposes.2 7 Under this common law
test, control over the employee's work is the primary indication of an employ28
ment relationship.
Subsequent courts, however, began to recognize that the purpose for which
workers are defined as employees in compensation law is entirely different from
the purpose for which workers are deemed servants under the vicarious liability
doctrine.2 9 The common law "servant" concept was developed to expand an

employer's tort liability to third parties for injuries resulting from the
workers' employment activities. 30 Conversely, compensation law is not
concerned with providing recovery for third parties.31 Rather, its purpose is to
compensate employees for work-related injuries whether the employer, the
employer's independent contractor or the employee himself causes the injury.32
The right to control an employee's work is not a crucial element to employer
33
liability under worker's compensation that it is under vicarious tort liability.

Consequently, many courts currently focus on the relationship between the
nature of the claimant's work and the regular business of the employer to
34
determine whether a worker is an "employee" under compensation statutes.
In defining employment relationships courts look to the intent and purpose
of workers' compensation.3

5

The courts' task has become increasingly difficult

because compensation legislation was enacted before the modern business con-

lationship of employer-employee is essential to liability for compensation benefits) (citing
Maige v. Cannon, 98 So. 2d 399, 401 (Fla. 1st D.C.A. 1957)).
25. See, e.g., Askew v. Macomber, 398 Mich. 212, 225, 247 N.W.2d 288, 290 (1976) (applying
the "economic reality" test to determine employment status); Caicco v. Toto Bros., Inc., 62
N.J. 305, 310, 301 A.2d 143, 145 (1973) (the "relative nature of the work" test determines employment status); Harris v. Seiavitch, 336 Pa. 294, 297, 9 A.2d 375, 376 (1939) (master and
servant relationship establishes employment relationship under the act).
26. 1C A. LARSON, supra note 6, § 43.00. Typical of these broad, relatively useless
definitions is the following: "[E]very person in the service of another under any contract for
hire, express or implied." Id. See, e.g., 5 IowA CODE ANN. § 85.61(2) (West Supp. 1982-1983); 13
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 176.011(9) (West Supp. 1982-1983).
27. See, e.g., Western Indem. Co. v. Pillsbury, 172 Cal. 807, 810, 159 P. 721, 723 (1916)
(the word "servant" is generally synonymous with the word "employee"); Sun Cab Co. v.
Powell, 196 Md. 572, 577, 77 A.2d 783, 785 (1951) (rules for determining "employer" and
"employee" relationship under the act are the same used at common law for determining
master and servant relationship).
28. E.g., Weeks v. Dickert Lumber Co., 270 Ala. 713, 121 So. 2d 894 (1960).
29. See IC A. LARSON, supra note 6, at § 43.42.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id. at § 43.50. The test examines the following elements: character of the claimant's
work or business, relationship of claimant's work to employer's business, and continuity of
claimant's work for the particular employer. Id. at § 43.52.
35. See supra notes 9-13 and accompanying text.
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glomerate prevailed in the American economy. 6 Thus, courts must consider
the overlapping doctrines of workers' compensation and corporate law in
determining whether tort immunity should extend to a parent corporation for
injuries to its subsidiary's employees.

Ti

Cou'oRATE ENTrry THEORY

A basic tenet of corporate law is that a corporation exists as a legal entity
completely separate from its shareholders and affiliated corporations. 37 Neither
shareholders nor affiliated corporations ordinarily bear legal responsibility for
the corporation's liabilities and obligations.38 Because the limited liability of
corporate shareholders is regarded as one of the primary advantages of in40
corporation,39 courts are hesitant to disregard the corporate entity.
Courts will disregard the theoretical distinction between shareholders and
corporate entities when the corporate structure has been used "to defeat public
convenience, justify wrong, protect fraud or defend crime."'41 Although no
uniform test exists for determining when courts will "pierce the corporate
veil," 42 the most widely used test has two prongs. 43 The first prong requires
proving a unity of interests and ownership such that the separate identities
of the corporation and the shareholders no longer exist in reality. 44 To satisfy
the second prong, courts must find that observance of strict legal identities will
lead to an inequitable result.45
36. Boggs v. Blue Diamond Coal Co., 590 F.2d 655, 658 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S.
836 (1979).
37. Ballantine, Separate Entity of Parent and Subsidiary Corporations,14 CALIF. L. REv.
12, 20 (1925). See also Kentucky Elec. Power Co. v. Norton Coal Mining Co., 93 F.2d 923,
926 (6th Cir. 1938); Exchange Nat'l Bank of Spokane v. Meikle, 61 F2d 176, 179 (9th Cir.
1932); Wilson v. Crooks, 52 F.2d 692, 694 (W.D. Mo. 1931).
58. See Douglas & Shanks, Insulation From Liability Through Subsidiary Corporations,
39 YALE L.J. 193, 193 (1929).
39. Id.
40. See Douglas & Shanks, supra note 38, at 193-95.
41. See, e.g., Henry v. Dolley, 99 F.2d 94, 97 (1oth Cir. 1938) (citing Dunnett v. Am, 71
F.2d 912, 918 (10th Cir. 1934)); Watson v. Bonfils, 116 F. 157, 165 (8th Cir. 1902); United
States v. Milwaukee Refrig. Transit Co., 142 F. 247, 255 (E.D. Wis. 1905).
42. In certain circumstances, courts may disregard the distinction between a corporation
and its shareholders or between affiliated corporations. Though courts have not recognized
a single definitive test, some general guidelines have emerged. See, e.g., United States v.
Reading Co., 253 US. 26 (1919) (if the court finds the corporate entity is merely the
instrumentality of an individual or another corporation, the corporate distinction will be
disregarded); McCaskill Co. v. United States, 216 US. 504 (1910) (court will pierce corporate
veil when corporate form has been used to work a wrong); Northern Sec. Co. v. United States,
193 U.S. 197 (1904) (corporate veil will be pierced when corporate form is used to evade a
statute).
43. FMC Fin. Corp. v. Murphree, 632 F.2d 413, 422 (5th Cir. 1980). Some courts require
proof of a third prong -that the fiction of the corporate structure worked an inequity on
the party trying to disregard that structure. E.g., Saphir v. Neustadt, 177 Conn. 191, 210, 413
A.2d 843, 853 (1979).
44. E.g., Automotriz Del Golfo de Cal. S.A. De C.V. v. Resnick, 47 Cal. 2d 792, 796, 306
P.2d 1, 3 (1957); Minifie v. Rowley, 187 Cal. 481, 487, 202 P. 673, 676 (1922).
45. Robert's Fish Farm v. Spenser, 153 So. 2d 718 (Fla. 1963); Computer Center, Inc. v.
Vedapco, Inc., 320 So. 2d 404, 406 (4th D.CA. 1975), cert. denied, 333 So. 2d 465 (Fla. 1976).
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In the context of a parent-subsidiary relationship, a showing of the parent's
control and domination of the subsidiary will satisfy the first prong. 46 To
determine the extent of control and domination, courts examine a number of
factors. 47 No combination of factors, however, has ever been established as
controlling.4 8 The lack of definitive guidelines is attributable to the case-bycase analysis courts use to determine the underlying relationship between
affiliated corporations.4 9 Under the second prong analysis, courts have traditionally focused on the effects on third parties- to determine whether inequity will result from upholding the corporate structure.5 ' If the court determined that allowing affiliated corporations to maintain their separate legal
identities would work an unjustice on a third party, the corporate veil would
be pierced.52
In special circumstances courts will allow a corporation to pierce its own
veil.58 In determining whether a parent corporation should be permitted to
pierce its own veil and avoid tort liability to its subsidiary's injured worker,
courts must examine the interface between the piercing doctrine and compen-

46. See, e.g., Owl Fumigating Corp. v. California Cyanide Co., 24 F.2d 718 (D.C. Del.
1928), aff'd, 30 F.2d 812 (3d Cir. .1929). The parent must be shown to have actually exercised
control over the subsidiary company. Proof of an opportunity to exercise control is inadequate. Atwater & Co. v. Fall River Pocahontas Collieries Co., 119 W. Va. 549, 560, 195
S.E. 99, 104 (1938). The basic inquiry is whether the controlling corporation treated the
subsidiary corporation as a separate entity. Mere identity of stockholders, directors and other
officers does not of itself indicate sufficient control to allow a court to collapse the corporate
structure. Additionally, inadequate financing of a subsidiary corporation by a parent corporation is not by itself sufficient to permit a court to pierce the veil. Id. at 560, 195 S.E. at 104.
47. See, e.g., Berkey v. Third Ave. Ry., 244 N.Y. 84, 88-89, 155 N.E. 58, 59 (1926).
The court looked to intercompany loans and unpaid advances, identity of officers, and the
adequacy of capitalization to determine the extent of the parent's control. Courts also
examine stock ownership and identity of management and directors between corporations as
evidence of control. Courts may place emphasis on the formalities used by the corporations.
For example, separate bank accounts, payment of employees out of the appropriate accounts
and non-interference by the parent's officers in the business of the subsidiary are formalities
examined by courts.
48. See supra notes 42-45 and accompanying text.
49. See Ballantine, supra note 37, at 14-16.
50. See, e.g., Feucht v. Real Silk Hosiery Mills, Inc., 105 Ind. App. 405, 411, 12 N.E.2d
1019, 1021 (1938) (when one corporation is organized and controlled by another corporation
such that it is merely an instrument of that corporation, the corporate entity will be disregarded to prevent injustice and fraud on third parties).
51. Id. at 19. Whether the corporate veil should be pierced is determined by the good
faith and honesty in the use of the corporate fiction for legitimate ends. Id.
52. Id.
53. See California Zinc Co. v. United States, 72 F. Supp. 591 (Ct. Cl. 1947). In Zinc, the
federal government pursuant to the eminent domain doctrine claimed certain lands for
building a dam. The plaintiffs, California Zinc Co. and its wholly-owned railway subsidiary,
alleged that the operation of the mining company and the railroad company was a single
integrated enterprise. The plaintiffs argued they were entitled to recover not only the value
of the part of each company taken but also the consequential damage to the remaining part
of the mining operation not taken by the government. The court allowed the corporations
to pierce their own veils in determining the compensation due in the eminent domain proceedings. Id.
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sation legislation. 4 If compensation acts reveal no policy against disregarding
corporate identities, courts must inquire whether a corporate law policy
prohibits a corporation from piercing its veil.
Tim INTERPLAY OF WORaRS' COMPENSATION THEORY AND
CORPORATE ENTITY THEORY

Generally when a plaintiff injured by the subsidiary's actions sues both
the parent corporation and subsidiary, the parent asserts its separate legal
status.P5 It does so to avoid being held legally responsible for its subsidiary's
actions and having its assets made available to satisfy the subsidiary's obligations.58 Conversely, the injured plaintiff seeks to collapse the corporate structures into a single entity and hold the parent corporation fully accountable for
its subsidiary's operations. 57 These positions are reversed in workers' compensation cases when the subsidiary's injured employee brings a civil suit against
the parent corporation. The parent corporation seeks to disavow its separate
legal status and share the subsidiary's tort immunity as the statutory "employer"
of the worker. 58 The plaintiff-employee seeks to have the separate legal identities
upheld so that he can sue the parent as third party tortfeasor and avoid having
his recovery limited to workers' compensation remedies. 9
The likely success of an injured employee's tort suit against his immediate
employer's parent corporation depends on the legal basis of the action. If the
injured worker sues the parent corporation for its negligent act independent
of the subsidiary's actions, the plaintiff faces the usual problems of proving
negligence. If the injured employee, however, attempts to hold the parent
corporation legally responsible for its subtidiary's action under agency theory,
the employee faces a dilemma. The employee's suit is premised on the theory
that the parent corporation so dominated the subsidiary that it should be held
liable for the subsidiary's actions.5 0 Yet, the more thoroughly the employee
proves the parent's domination of the subsidiary, the more he shows that, in
54. See, e.g., Mingin v. Continental Can Co., 171 N.J. Super. 148, 150, 408 A2d 146, 147
(1979) (issue is whether the separate operations must be treated as one amalgamated unit and
no recovery beyond workers' compensation benefits may be obtained); Phillips v. Stowe Mills,
Inc., 5 N.C. App. 150, 153, 167 S.E.2d 817, 820 (1969) (compensation statute did not extend
tort immunity to parent corporation from injuries to subsidiary's employees).
55. See, e.g., Zaist v. Olson, 154 Conn. 563, 227 A.2d 552 (1967) (stockholder and two
affiliated corporations asserted legal distinctness); Bartle v. Home Owners Coop., Inc., 309 N.Y.
103, 127 N.E.2d 832 (1955) (parent corporation asserted legal separateness from subsidiary).
56. See supranotes 37-38 and accompanying text.
57. See, e.g., Walkovszky v. Carlton, 18 N.Y.2d 414, 223 N.E.2d 6, 276 N.YS.2d 585 (1966)
(plaintiff sought to collapse affiliated corporations into a single entity and hold that entity

liable for the alleged damages).
58.

See supra notes 6-11 and accompanying text. See also O'Brien v. Grumman Corp.,

475 F. Supp. 284 (S.D.N.Y. 1979).
59. See supra notes 6-11 and accompanying text.
60. See, e.g., Berkey v. Third Ave. Ry., 244 N.Y. 84, 95, 155 N.E. 58, 61 (1926) (the
parent corporation will be deemed the subsidiary's principal if it exercises enough domination

and control over the subsidiary to satisfy the law of agency). See RESrATEMENT
AGENCY § 217 (1958) [hereinafter cited as RESTATEMENT (SECOND)].
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effect, the subsidiary has no separate identity. 61 Thus the parent corporation
would share the subsidiary's immunity from suit under the compensation act.
The parent corporation likewise faces a dilemma irrespective of the employee's theory of recovery. The parent corporation deliberately chose to
legally separate the operating units of its enterprise. Even if no separate economic entities exist in reality, the parent corporation has reaped the benefits
of this organizational structure. 62 In contesting the worker's suit, however, the
parent company that has enjoyed the benefits of separate corporations now
requests the court to recognize a single entity for workers' compensation
purposes. 63 If successful, the parent company will be able to prove an employment relationship sufficient to confer tort immunity. 64
The JudicialResponse
To resolve the conflicting claims of injured employees and parent
corporations, courts must decide how the statutory term "employer" should
be defined because compensation acts provide inadequate definitions. 65 Employment relationships in the parent/subsidiary context could be defined in
two ways. Under the first approach, courts could focus on the economic relationship between the two corporations. If a high degree of economic integration exists between the corporations, the businesses could be treated as the
single employer of all the workers in the economic enterprise. Alternatively,
courts could adopt a joint employment test and focus on the workers' employment relationship with each corporation. Both approaches examine employment relationships, but the economic integration test differs from the joint
employment test because the former focuses on employers while the latter
focuses on employees.
Until recently, most courts have dealt with the problematic definition of
"employer" in the parent/subsidiary context using the joint employment
test.66 Joint employment occurs when a common employee performs work for
both corporations under the simultaneous control of both.67 For a court to find
61. See, e.g., Coco v. Winston Indus. 330 So. 2d 649, 654 (La. App. 1976), rev'd on
other grounds, 341 So. 2d 332 (1977) (control over the subsidiary's operations is sufficient
to find an employment relationship between the parent company and its subsidiary's employees).
62. Separate corporations may be formed for a variety of reasons. The parent may have
created them to enter a new market, introduce a new product or establish a new location.
Additionally, the parent may have created subsidiaries to realize tax benefits. See I.R.C.
§ 11(b) (Vest Supp. 1983) (marginal corporate tax rates).
63. E.g., Gulfstream Land & Dev. v. Wilkerson, 420 So. 2d 587, 590 (Fla. 1982).
64. Harvey v. Fine Prod. Co., 156 Ga. App. 649, 275 S.E.2d 732 (1980). The parent
corporation was held the "alter ego" of the wholly-owned subsidiary company and immune
to the tort suit of the subsidiary's employee. Id. at 650, 275 S.E.2d at 733.
65. See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
66. See, e.g., Babineaux v. Southeastern Drilling Corp., 170 So. 2d 518 (La. Ct. App.)
(claimant was hired by one affiliate but was subject to the control of two others; therefore
joint employment existed), appeal dismissed, 382 U.S. 16 (1965); Del Peso v. HA. Bar &
Restaurant Co., 75 N.J. Super. 108, 182 A.2d 373, 380 (1962) (concluding that joint employment existed).
67. See IC A. LARSON, supra note 6, § 48.40. Additionally, joint employment occurs when
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joint employment no actual employment agreement need exist.66 The worker
must only perform duties for the common benefit of both companies. 9
In Gauss v. Hartwell Co.,70 the Massachusetts Supreme Court applied the
joint employment test to determine if the parent as well as the subsidiary was
a worker's employer. In Gauss, a subsidiary's employee was killed during a
coal delivery to a customer of the parent corporation. 7 1 The employee's widow
brought a tort action against the parent company for negligence.7 2 Noting that
the parent frequently used its subsidiary's employees for coal deliveries to its
customers, 73 the majority held the worker to be jointly employed by both
corporations and thus limited the widow's recovery to compensation benefits. 4
The court reached this conclusion without analyzing the economic relationship
of the corporations. 5 The Gauss court's rationale demonstrates that the joint
employment test focuses entirely on the work relationship between the em6
ployee and each corporation separately.
No court addressed the issue of whether the economic integration of
affiliated corporations could serve as a basis for defining employment status
until Boggs v. Blue Diamond Coal Co."" The Boggs plaintiffs were widows of
miners who worked for a wholly-owned subsidiary of the defendant parent
corporation and were killed in a mining accident."8 After receiving compensation benefits from the subsidiary, the widows sued the parent company for
negligent operation of the subsidiary's coal mines. 9
The parent company claimed tort immunity under the compensation act
an employee performs work for two affiliated corporations, and the service for each employer
is closely related to the work for the other corporation. Id.
68. Id. Moreover, there is no need to find the parent and subsidiary to be a single entity.
In fact, the joint employment test implicity acknowledges the separate legal identities of the
parent and its subsidiary. Id.
69. See, e.g., Wabash Smelting, Inc. v. Murphy, 134 Ind. App. 198, 186 N.E.2d 586 (1962).
70. 338 Mass. 353, 155 NE.2d 415 (1959).
71. Id. at 354, 155 N.E2d at 415. The subsidiary was a coal retailer, and the parent
corporation was a coal wholesaler. Id.
72. Id., 155 N.E.2d at 415.
73. Id., 155 N.E.2d at 416. The court noted that the parent company owned no trucks to
deliver coal to its customers. The parent therefore contracted with transportation companies
and its own subsidiary to make coal deliveries. Id.
74. Id., 155 N.E.2d at 415. The court analogized the parent/subsidiary relationship to
that of a principal contractor/subcontractor relationship. The court found the subsidiary's
work to be the regular work of the parent's business and thus the parent company was
immune. Id., 155 N.E.2d at 416.
75. Id. at 355, 155 N.E.2d at 416. The court merely stated that the subsidiary's status as
the corporate creation of the parent reinforced its conclusion. Id., 155 N.E.2d at 416.
76. See supranotes 67-68 and accompanying text.
77. 590 F.2d 655 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 US. 836 (1979).
78. Id. at 657.
79. Id. at 655. The parent corporation provided safety and engineering services to the
subsidiary company, including advice and assistance in mine ventilation. The parent company
negligently delayed the construction of improvements needed to minimize the accumulation
of dangerous methane gas. It also authorized removal of existing ventilation and safety
devices in order to open a new mine tunnel but concealed its action from federal mine
inspectors. These negligent actions caused the explosion of methane gas that killed the
miners. Id. at 658.
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asserting that the two corporations produced coal as an integrated business
and were in reality a single employer."' The parent corporation provided
accounting, financial, and management services to the subsidiary and retained
primary responsibility for safety within the mines.81 Mining the coal was the
subsidiary's sole function in the overall economic enterprise.8 2 This integration
of mining operations strongly indicated that the separate corporations were a
single economic enterprise,83 but the court refused to characterize the parent
company as the deceased miners' "employer" under the act.84
Rather than analyzing the corporations' economic interrelationship, the
majority held the parent corporation to its chosen form of operations. 5 The
court noted that corporate law allows the parent company to divide its
operations as it sees fit.88 The majority added, however, that when operational
benefits s 7 accrue to the parent company, reciprocity requires upholding the

corporations' separate legal identities in suits brought by a subsidiary's injured
employee.8 8 Further, the tort system should not deny recovery to injured employees simply because the alleged tortfeasor controls the workers' immediate
employer.8 9
The Boggs majority emphasized that the parent corporation was not being
held liable for the negligence of its subsidiary under the doctrine of respondeat
superior.O Rather, the parent's failure to operate the mines safely was an
independent act of negligence, and neither agency nor compensation law
could insulate the parent against liability for its actions.91 The Boggs decision
to hold corporations to their separate legal forms for compensation purposes
has become the current trend in both state and federal courts. 92 The Boggs
holding, however, has been narrowed to apply only to cases in which a parent
80. Id. at 658.
81. Id. at 657-58.
82.

Id.

83. Control over the subsidiary's operations and finances are very strong indications that
the corporations constituted a single economic enterprise. See also NLRB v. Deena Artware,
Inc., 361 U.S. 398, 403-04 (1960) (suggesting that corporations' affairs may be so intertwined that there are no distinct corporate lines).
84. 590 F.2d at 663. The court noted, however, several factors that supported the parent
corporation's single economic enterprise position. First, the parent entered into sales contracts
based upon coal to be produced at its subsidiaries' mines. Second, all coal produced by the
deceased miners' subsidiary was sold and shipped at the direction of the parent. Third, all
sales were invoiced to the parent company and deposited in its account. Fourth, all of the
subsidiaries' expenses were paid by the parent company. Id. at 657.
85. Id. at 662-63. The court briefly analyzed existing corporate law and concluded the
parent corporation should not be allowed to pierce its own veil. Id.
86. Id. at 662.
87. See supra note 62.

88. 590 F.2d at 662.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 663.

91. Id.
92. See, e.g., Stoddard v. Ling-Temco-Vought, Inc., 513 F. Supp. 314 (C.D. Cal. 1980)
(great weight of authority holds a subsidiary's employee may sue the parent corporation as

third party); O'Brien v. Grumann Corp., 475 F. Supp. 284 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) (suit against parent
corporation by subsidiary's employee not barred by Georgia's Workmen's Compensation

statute); see also 2A A. LARSON, supra note 6, § 72.40.
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company's independent acts of negligence cause injury to its subsidiary's em3
ployees0
In Love v. Flour Mills of America, Inc. 94 the court set forth the rationale

for narrowing the Boggs holding. In that case plaintiffs were injured when their
immediate employer's grain elevator exploded.9 5 After recovering compensation
benefits, the injured workers brought negligence suits against the parent
corporation. The plaintiffs alleged that the parent failed to provide a safe
work place and failed to warn them of the dangers within the subsidiary's
mill.5 Citing Boggs, the court declared that a parent corporation which assumes
separate and independent corporate status would not be permitted to share its
subsidiary's tort immunity under the act.97 The court added, however, that
finding the parent to be a third party subject to tort liability only completed
the threshold inquiry. 3 For the parent to be liable, its independent act of
negligence unconnected to the management of its subsidiary must cause the
injury to the subsidiary's workers. 99 The plaintiffs merely alleged that the
parent corporation, in its capacity as a shareholder, should have recognized
the hazardous conditions at the facility and instructed its subsidiary to correct
them.100 The court held the parent's actions as a shareholder were not independent acts of negligence and dismissed the case. 101 The Love court reasoned
that holding the parent liable would have the effect of placing upon shareholders the employer's nondelegable duty to provide employees a safe work
environment.102 Moreover, such a holding would have the anomalous effect
of treating corporate shareholders as employers and then refusing to grant
them employer immunity under the compensation act. 03
Relying on Boggs, the Love court failed to consider the economic integration
between the corporations as a means of determining employment relationships
under the compensation statute' 04 The Boggs analysis starts with the premise
that corporate identities will be upheld for compensation purposes. 0 5 This
approach has not been uniformly adopted by all states. 08 Some courts will
pierce the corporate veil whether the injured employee is suing the parent in
93. See Samaras v. Gatx Leasing Corp., 75 A.D.2d 890, 428 N.YS.2d 48 (1980).
94. 647 F.2d 1058 (10th Cir. 1981).

95. Id. at 1059.
96. Id.

97. Id. at 1062.
98.

Id.

99. Id.
100.

Id. at 1063. The plaintiffs asserted that since the parent owned other grain elevators

and companies operating similar mills, it should have been aware of the dangerous
conditions at the plaintiffs' mills. Id.
101. Id.
102.

Id. Thus, in Love the lack of duty to the subsidiary's employees, not immunity con-

ferred by a compensation act, spared the parent company from liability.
103.
104.

Id.
Id. at 1062. The court cited Boggs and summarily held the companies to their

separate corporate structures. Id.
105. See, e.g., Choate v. Landis Tool Co., 486 F. Supp. 774 (ED. Mich. 1980); Buchner v.
Pines Hotel, Inc., 87 A.D.2d 691, 448 N.Y.S.2d 870 (1982).
106. See 2A A. LAksoN, supra note 6, § 72.40.
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negligence for its own actions or under respondeat superior for its subsidiary's
actions.107
In Beck v. Flint Construction Co.1os the court refused to hold affiliated
corporations to their strict legal forms. 0 9 The Beck plaintiff suffered a serious
injury on land jointly used by the parent and subsidiary corporations.1 0 The
parent corporation owned the land and was plaintiff's immediate employer.-

After successfully claiming workers' compensation, the employee brought a
negligence suit against the subsidiary.112 The suit alleged that the subsidiary,
as a joint occupant, exercised control over the premises and breached a duty to
treat the plaintiff, worker-invitee, with reasonable care. 13
The employee thus found himself in the classic dilemma." 4 If he did not
allege the subsidiary corporation to be the alter ego of the parent company,
then no evidence existed that the subsidiary exercised control over the premises
or had any duty to keep the premises safe for the parent's employees." 5
Alternatively, if plaintiff relied on the alter ego theory, the subsidiary would
share the parent's immunity under the compensation statute." 6 The court
therefore upheld summary judgment for the subsidiary corporation." 7
107. Beck v. Flint Constr. Co., 154 Ga. App. 490, 268 S.E.2d 739 (1980).
108. Id.
109. Id. at 492, 268 S.E.2d at 741.
110. Id. at 490, 268 S.E.2d at 740. The subsidiary occupied four offices as a tenant in the
parent's building. Id.
il.
Id. at 491,268 S.E.2d at 740.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 492, 268 S.E.2d at 741.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 492-93, 268 S.E.2d at 741. See also GA. CODE ANN. § 114.103 (1974).
117. 154 Ga. App. at 493, 268 S.E.2d at 741. The Beck holding, however, does not apply
to cases in which the parent clearly has an independent duty to the injured worker. For
example, consider the case of a parent corporation that manufactures machines for its own
use and for sale to other non-affiliated corporations. If the parent corporation installs one
of its machines in a wholly-owned subsidiary, the parent corporation has an independent
duty to each employee of the subsidiary for their machines.
The products liability doctrine adds some policy considerations that are not present in
the normal workers' compensation case. First, courts have found that consumers of products
need special protection against defects in those products. Second, courts generally agree that
consumers of a product should bear the cost of compensating consumers injured by that product through increased prices. Courts therefore impose strict liability on companies that manufacture defective products which cause injury. See, e.g., Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc.,
127 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1962); see generally W. PROSSER, LAW OF
ToRTs, 657-58 (4th ed. 1971). This stricter standard of liability might well be applied to the
parent machine manufacturer that installs a defective machine in its subsidiary's plant, resulting in worker injury.
When the user of the product is the employee of the manufacturer, a special situation
arises. If the employee is injured using his employer's product while not on the job, he will
recover on the same theory as any other consumer would. If, however, the employee is injured
on the job using a machine manufactured by his employer, courts disagree about limiting
his recovery to workers' compensation benefits. Some courts allow a products liability suit
notwithstanding compensation benefits. These courts reason that the worker's employer
occupies a dual capacity, as the statutory employer and the manufacturer of machines. They
allow workers to sue the employer under this second capacity. These courts would clearly
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Although the Beck court indicated that it would allow parent and subsidiary to disregard their separate corporate identities, that court, like the
Boggs and Love courts, failed to examine carefully the economic integration of
the corporations. Coco v. Winston Industries,Inc.118 illustrates that a minority
of courts will analyze the economic integration of affiliated corporations even
in suits involving an independent act of negligence by the parent corporation.
The plaintiff, in Coco, was employed by Sherwood Homes, Inc., the whollyowned subsidiary of Winston Industries, Inc.119 After sustaining injuries, the
worker brought a tort action against Winston alleging that it had negligently
designed and installed a hazardous saw in its subsidiary's place of business.20
To resolve Winston's claim of tort immunity as the statutory "employer" of the
plaintiff, the court applied a "nature of the work" test.1 2 1 Under this test, if
the claimant is pursuing the trade, business or occupation of the parent
corporation at the time of injury then the immunity provision bars the tort
suit.12 2 Noting the degree of economic integration between Winston and
Sherwood Homes, the court concluded these corporations were mere alter
egos of one another. 23 Thus, when the worker was performing work for the
subsidiary corporation, he was also performing the parent's business. 2 The
court therefore ruled Winston was plaintiff's statutory employer and dis1 25
missed the case.
The above cases present a variety of factual situations, but the basic issue
dividing the courts is whether corporations should be permitted to disregard
their own legal identities and assume a single identity as a statutory employer
under the acts. Courts permitting corporations to pierce their veils realize that
the corporate entity theory and the piercing doctrine do not necessarily remain viable in workers' compensation cases. In contrast, courts following
Boggs strictly apply these concepts in compensation cases. The latter approach,
however, has serious flaws.
M

Inadequaciesof the Boggs Holding
The intent of the Boggs holding is to preserve employees' common law
lights to sue those responsible for negligent acts. 26 No strong compensation
allow a subsidiary's employee to sue the parent corporation as the manufacturer of the
machine. A complete discussion of employers' dual capacity is beyond the scope of this
note and it is assumed that dual capacity of an employer is not at issue. For a discussion of
the dual persona doctrine see 2A A. LARsON, supra note 6, § 72.83.
118. 330 So. 2d 649 (La. Ct. App.), rev'd on other grounds, 341 So. 2d 332 (1976).
119. 330 So. 2d at 652.
120. Id.

121. Id. at 653-55.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.

Id.
Id. at 654.
Id.
Id. at 667.
Boggs, 590 F.2d at 655 (1979). The court noted that the workers' compensation

legislation is not intended to abrogate existing common law tort remedies for workers. Rather,
its purpose is to provide social insurance to compensate victims of industrial accidents because the common law rights of injured workers are inadequate. Because workers' com-
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policy exists which mandates destroying either statutory or common law rights
against third party tortfeasors.127 Nevertheless, the benefits and limitations
under compensation statutes are predicated on the employment relationship.128
Thus, identifying the employment relationship is the initial step in determining
employer immunity from tort liability under workers' compensation.
The Boggs analysis, however, prevents a parent corporation from proving
an employment relationship exists with the injured employee of its subsidiary. 1 29 Under Boggs, courts hold affiliated corporations to their separate
legal forms without examining the degree of economic integration between
them. 1 30 Yet the more economically integrated the corporations, the more

likely it is that an employment relationship exists between the injured worker
and the parent corporation. 31 Moreover, when the parent company actually
132
controls the subsidiary, it directly controls the employment of the worker.
Control over the worker is a traditional factor courts have weighed in determining the employment relationship.13s Boggs summarily restricts such an inquiry'34 by refusing to pierce the corporate veil in compensation cases.
The strict application of Boggs not only fails to provide an adequate test
for determining employment relationships, it also leads to poorly reasoned
cases. Consider the following example. An employee of a small wholesale
manufacturer is injured by an assembly-line machine at the manufacturer's
place of business. Prior to the injury, a competing corporation purchases all
of the wholesale manufacturer's stock, making it a wholly-owned subsidiary.
Subsequently, the parent corporation effectively controls the operations of its
subsidiary by providing all of the subsidiary's financial, accounting and engineering services. The parent also supervises the maintenance of its subsidiary's machines, although the maintenance is actually performed by the
subsidiary's employees. The subsidiary's liability to the worker remains unpensation benefits have remained low, courts have liberally construed the coverage provision
of the acts while narrowly construing the immunity provisions. Id. at 660-61.
127. See 2A A. LARSON, supra note 6, § 72 (1976).

128. See id. § 2.10.
129. See supra notes 86-90 & 106-107 and accompanying text. The parent corporation
would still be able to prove that. it had a separate employment relationship independent
of the subsidiary. See supra notes 70-76 and accompanying text. If the court applies a strict
control test, however, a parent corporation will probably be unable to demonstrate control
over the subsidiary's employee when the corporate structure is well-developed and the worker
has a low position within that structure. For a summary of the control test used by many
courts, see RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 60, § 217.
130. See, e.g., Gigax v. Ralston Purina Co., 136 Cal. App. 3d 591, 186 Cal. Rptr. 895 (1982).
The court specifically noted that compensation statutes do not address the problem of
whether a parent corporation is immune from tort action by its subsidiary's injured employees. The preeminent factor to be considered, however, is the right of control. Thus, the
issue of extended immunity requires a factual determination. Id. at 598-600, 186 Cal. Rptr.
at 399-400.
131. See, e.g., Nichols v. Uniroyal, Inc., 399 So. 2d 751 (La. Ct. App. 1981). The more
integration between corporations, the more likely the operations of both are controlled by a
centralized management.
132. Id.
13. See supra note 26-28 and accompanying text.
134. See supra notes 105-107 and accompanying text.
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changed notwithstanding the merger. Yet, under Boggs, the worker could bring
a tort action against the parent for its negligence in not protecting its subsidiary's employees from machine defects.
Increasing the parent's liability simply because of a merger seems inappropriate for two reasons. First, the nature and risk of the employee's work
have not changed. Second, by overseeing the safety of the subsidiary's operations
the parent corporation is performing the duties of an employer. Given the
objectives of compensation legislation, 35 permitting employees to sue an affiliated corporation that negligently performs employer functions seems anomalous
since the worker could not sue his immediate employer for similar negligence. 13 Some legislatures have reconciled this anomaly by extending im-

munity to entities that perform an employer's functionj 37 The Boggs holding
rejects this approach. The parent cannot assume the identity of the subsidiary
regardless of the benefits provided to the subsidiary's employees. 38 Under
Boggs, corporate form rather than economic substance becomes all important.
Consequencesof the Current Trend

The current trend will provide less incentive for affiliated corporate employers to settle promptly workers' compensation daims3 9 For example, a
parent corporation that could be liable to the subsidiary's injured employee
as a third party tortfeasor, may well decide to contest the workers' compensation claim and litigate the employment issue. If the parent is found to be a
statutory employer, then it shares the subsidiary's immunity from a subsequent
tort action' 4 0 Litigating the employer issue in a compensation proceeding
135. See THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON STATE WORKMEN'S

COMPENSATION, THE REPORT OF
NATIONAL COMMISSION ON STATES' WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAWS 35 (1972). The
four basic objectives of a modem compensation program are as follows: (1) broad coverage
THE

of work-related injuries and diseases; (2) substantial protection against interruption of in-

come; (3) providing sufficient medical care and rehabilitation services; and (4) encouraging
safety. Id.
136. Id. at 52.
137. See, eg., FLA. STAT. § 440.11(2) (1981) which provides:
"An employer's workers' compensation carrier, service agent, or safety consultant shall
not be liable as a third-party tortfeasor for assisting the employer in carrying out the
employer's rights and responsibilities under this chapter by furnishing any safety
inspection, safety consultative service, or other safety service incidential to the
workers' compensation...."
Id.
138. See Boggs, 590 F.2d at 655.
139. See 3 A. LASON, supra note 6, at § 82.00. The vast majority of compensation claims are
disposed of by agreement, without any contest at the administrative or at the judicial level.
140. The parent corporation could pressure a worker into waiving his tort rights by
litigating the course of employment issue, thus threatening the worker with no recovery at
all. A problem, however, with this approach is that the doctrines of collateral estoppel or
res judicata could be applied at the tort trial if the parent loses at the administrative level.
If the conventional elements of res judicata are present, a prior decision or finding on any
relevant issue in a compensation proceeding is res judicata as to the same issue in a subsequent suit at law to recover for the same injury or death. This rule applies whether the
effect is to defeat the civil suit or to defeat a a defense to the civil suit. This rule has been
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undercuts the workers' compensation objective to produce prompt and
adequate indemnification to the injured employee. 14 1 Additionally, this litigation burdens the workers' compensation administrative system and increases
42
the cost of administering benefits.
The Boggs holding also provides an incentive for the parent corporation
to merge and operate subsidiaries as divisions rather than as separate
corporations.143 The strength of the incentive to merge depends on whether
the industry is labor'14 or capital1 45 intensive and whether other benefits will
arise from operating separately.146 Corporations that were not previously
economically integrated would become one employer under the statutes. Thus,
an employee who had a cause of action against the parent before the merger
47
would no longer have one after the merger.

applied when the issue was the existence of the employment relations. See, e.g., Lovette v.
Braun, 293 F. Supp. 41 (D.N.D. 1968) (plaintiff who successfully claims compensation is
barred from raising employment status in subsequent civil suit against employer); Smith v.
General Motors Corp., 63 F. Supp. 101, 103 (E.D. Mo. 1945) (federal court concluded it
could reexamine a determination made by the Missouri Compensation Commission that
decedent was defendant's employee). The advantage of litigating the employment issue before
an administrative board is that the ruling body should be familiar with issues in the case and
should not be bound by common law concepts that are inconsistent with compensation
legislation.
141. See, e.g., Blount v. State Road Dep't, 87 So. 2d 507, 512 (Fla. 1956) ("[t]he act is
designed to afford a speedy and summary disposition of claims"); Barber Asphalt Corp. v.
Industrial Comm'n, 193 Utah 371, -- , 135 P2d 266, 270 (1943) (workers' compensation
intended to secure means of speedy recovery of benefits).
142. All but a small fraction of compensation claims are disposed without contest. See
3 A. LARSON, supra note 6, at § 82.10.
143. See Hughey v. Hoffman Rosner Corp., 109 Ill.
App. 3d 633, 440 N.E.2d 1049 (1982).
The plaintiff was barred from bringing a common law suit against parent corporation because both corporations merged before the injury, changing the status of the workers' immediate employer from a subsidiary to a division. Id. at -,
440 N.E.2d at 1051. Since the
Boggs court put such emphasis on corporate structure, a parent could gain tort immunity
by merging with its subsidiaries.
144. G. AMMER & D. AMMER, DICTIONARY OF BUSINESS AND ECONOMics 227 (1977). "Labor
intensive" describes an industry that requires a large portion of labor input relative to capital
investment. For example, many agricultural enterprises are labor intensive simply because
the maintenance and harvesting of many crops require work that machinery cannot perform. Id. The more labor intensive an industry is, the higher the cost of workers' compensation will be.
145. Id. at 59. "Capital intensive" describes an industry that requires a large capital input relative to the amount of labor or land necessary to conduct the enterprise. Id.
146. See supra note 62.
147. Courts could circumvent this result by finding that the cause of action arose before
the merger. See Billy v. Consolidated Mach. Tool Corp., 51 N.Y.2d 152, 412 N.E.2d 934, 432
N.Y.S.2d 879 (1980). In this case the employee was killed by a machine while at work. The
widow brought a wrongful death action against the decedent's employer and the machine's
manufacturers with which the decedent's employer had merged. The court noted that the
manufacturers and the decedent's employer had merged before the worker's death. Id. at
156-58, 412 N.E.2d at 937-38, 432 N.Y.S.2d at 881-82. Nonetheless, the court allowed the
wrongful death action. The court reasoned that the parent had inherited through the
corporate merger the obligations and liabilities of the third party tortfeasor manufacturer.
Id. at 161, 412 N.E.2d at 940, 432 N.Y.S.2d at 884. But cf. cases cited supra note 140.
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A PRoPosAL
To avoid the shortcomings of the Boggs rationale courts should adopt an
alternative approach for determining employment relationships in compensation cases. Courts should examine the economic integration of affiliated
corporations and permit such corporations to disregard their separate legal
identities if in reality they are one entity. Focusing on economic realities to
determine employment relationships would not disrupt the balance of employer and employee interests under compensation law. Moreover, compensation law's tort immunity provisions would be interpreted in line with
modern corporate realities. A brief analysis demonstrates the advantages of
this approach.
Under this approach courts could conduct a factual inquiry into employment relationships without being bound by the legal fictions of the corporate
entity.1 The corporate entity is a misplaced concept in workers' compensation,
and courts should disregard it.14 9 This "economic reality" approach was used
by the court in Wells v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co.150 In that case, the injured
worker brought a products liability suit against the parent corporation of his
immediate employer.'i l The parent moved for summary judgment, claiming
that the exclusive remedy of workers' compensation barred plaintiff's tort
suit.22

Under the economic reality approach, the Wells court examined several
factors to determine whether the parent company was the injured worker's
statutory employer.153 Some factors, such as employee benefit programs, union
membership, and payroll procedures, pertained to the relationship between
the subsidiary's workers and the parent corporation.- Other factors, such as
control over the subsidiary's operations, accounting, and hiring and firing,
related to the economic association of the parent and subsidiary corporations. 155
After examining these factors, the court found the parent corporation to be
the worker's "employer" and granted summary judgment for the parent. 156
Examining economic realities and allowing corporations to pierce their
own veils would maintain the balance of interests under compensation law.-7
148. See, e.g., White v. Searls & White Tree Serv., 60 Mich. App. 714, 231 N.W.2d 522
(1975); Bell v. Hartman, 44 Or. App. 21, 604 P.2d 1273 (1980).
149. See 2A A. LARSON, supra note 6, § 72-81. Legal fictions have no place in the interpretation of detailed modem compensation acts. It is one thing to resort to fictions to create
new law out of thin air. It is quite another to take a compensation statute consisting of
pages of fine print and judicially announce that pre-existing legal fictions define the key
terms of the act. Id.

150. 97 Mich. App. 790,296 N.W2d 174 (1980).
151. Id. at 792, 296 N.W.2d at 175. The plaintiff was injured when a truck rim manufactured by Firestone blew apart as he was changing a tire. His immediate employer was a
wholly-owned subsidiary of Firestone. Id.
152. Id. at 792-93, 296 N.W.2d at 175.
153. Id. at 798, 296 N.W.2d at 176.
154. Id. at 794-96, 296 N.W.2d at 176-77.
155. Id. at 796,296 N.W.2d at 177.
156. Id.
157. See supra notes 4-9 and accompanying text. The basis of workers' compensation is a

compromise between employers and employees. In exchange for guaranteeing benefits for
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Courts should apply similar standards in determining both tort immunity and
employer's liability for compensation benefits under the acts. 58 If a court
would hold a parent company liable for compensation benefits to its subsidiary's employees, then the parent should be immune to tort liability in
actions by the subsidiary's employees. 59 Strictly holding corporations to their
legal identities as in Boggs does not result in such uniform analysis.
Some courts admit to liberally construing coverage provisions while
narrowly construing immunity provisions. 160 These courts support their bias
by adverting to the inadequacies of current compensation benefits. 1" Although
broadly construing coverage provisions may increase the number of employees
162
If
that receive benefits, it will not increase the amount workers receive.
benefits are inadequate it is up to the legislatures, not the courts, to increase
163
the benefits.
Some courts may be reluctant to adopt the suggested approach because of
their perception that it would adversely affect employee recoveries against
third parties.16 4 These courts must realize that employment relationships
should be determined according to compensation law. 65 In addition, they must
all work related injuries, employers were granted immunity from tort suits by their employees.
If courts apply two different standards, one for compensation liability and another for tort
immunity, then the courts are distorting the compromise. Id.
158. See, e.g., Boggs, 590 F.2d at 662; State v. Florida Indus. Comm'n., 151 So. 2d 636,
640 (Fla. 1963) (act should be given liberal construction in favor of claimant but administered and interpreted in fairness to both sides).
159. See, e.g., Florida Forest & Park Serv. v. Strickland, 154 Fla. 472, 477-78, 18 So. 2d
251, 254 (1944) (provisions of the act are to be interpreted as constituting a contract between the parties embracing all the provisions of the statute). See also Boggs, 590 F.2d at 662
(arguing that in the long run the majority's decision may lead to less benefits for employees).
160. See, e.g., Choate v. Landis Tool Co., 486 F. Supp. 774, 776 (E.D. Mich. 1980).
161. Cf. FLA. STAT. § 440.14 (1981). If a worker is covered by workers' compensation then
the amount of his recovery is defined by statute. Due to the exclusive remedy provisions of
the statutes, the worker can recover only a fixed amount from the employer and no more.
162. See, e.g., Boggs, 590 F.2d at 655.
163. Workers' compensation is a creation of the legislature. Accordingly, the courts
should not distort the meaning of the statutes simply because the benefits have become
outdated. See Thompson v. Florida Indus. Comm'n, 224 So. 2d 286, 287 (Fla. 1969) (remedy
for any inadequacy in the act lies with the legislature and not with the court).
164. See, e.g., Mingin v. Continental Can Co., 171 N.J. Super. 148, 149, 408 A.2d 146, 148
(1979). The claimant was injured operating a machine for his employer, and he received
workers' compensation benefits from his employer's insurance carrier. He later brought a
products liability suit against the manufacturer of the machine and its parent company. The
claimant's employer, however, was a wholly-owned subsidiary of the same parent corporation.
The defendant corporations moved for summary judgment asserting that the claimant's
exclusive remedy was workers' compensation. Citing Boggs, the court denied the motion and
thus the claimant was not barred from maintaining a tort action against the parent. The
Mingin court noted the inadequacy of the workers' compensation statute in addressing the
issues involved in the parent-subsidiary relationship. The court, however, held the defendants
to their chosen form. The majority appeared to be intimidated by the potential results of
allowing the corporation to disregard its own legal identity. The result of the corporation's
proposition, the court reasoned, would be to deny products liability suits to a significant
percentage of the population. Given the growth of modern business conglomerates, such a
drastic result should only be mandated by the legislature. Id.
165. See supra notes 21-24 and accompanying text.
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realize that the proposed approach will not necessarily allow large diversified
conglomerates to avoid tort liability. These companies will not be integrated
enough to demonstrate that they are in reality a single economic enterprise.
CONCLUSION

The workers' compensation system has performed reasonably well over the
years in providing benefits to injured workers. As inflation has increased, however, the absolute value of these benefits have decreased.168 Some courts have
attempted to remedy this situation by narrowly construing immunity provisions while broadly construing coverage provisions.6 7 Although this judicial
response increases the potential of workers' recoveries, it also denies tort immunity to some employers deserving the statutes' protection. 68 Courts holding
parent/subsidiary corporations to strict legal identities often improperly deny
tort immunity. Rather than rigidly adhering to legal fictions, courts should
permit affiliated corporations to assume a single identity if the facts of the case
demonstrate that such an economic association exists in reality. This approach
would maintain the integrity of compensation provisions and properly place
the issue of inadequate benefits for injured workers with the legislatures.
JEFFFRY

M.

FULLER

166. See Boggs, 590 F.2d at 659.
167. Id.

168. See supranotes 80-85 and accompanying text.
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